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PRESERVING 
ELECTRICITY MARKET 
EFFICIENCY WHILE 
CLOSING IRELAND’S 
CAPACITY GAP∗ 
Seán Lyons, John Fitz Gerald, Niamh McCarthy, Laura 
Malaguzzi Valeri and Richard S.J. Tol 
 The public perception of electricity regulation focuses on price 
outcomes: are prices low or high, rising or falling, stable or volatile. 
However, the quantity and quality dimensions of electricity services 
also have important effects on societal welfare. Although electricity 
is essentially a homogeneous good, the services that deliver it may 
be differentiated in ways that are significant to users; in particular, 
by the reliability standard they deliver.1 Ideally, we should choose 
the set of market arrangements that will deliver, both now and in 
the future, the preferred quantity and quality of electricity services at 
prices that are as low as possible.    
 
Because electrical energy is costly to store and the lead-time for 
constructing new generation capacity is long in comparison to 
demand fluctuations, the key decisions affecting quantity and quality 
of electricity services are the mix and timing of investment in 
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1 Consumers may also differentiate electricity by its source (e.g., carbon-neutral, 
non-nuclear) but that is not the focus of this paper. 
different types of generating plants. The system should have an 
optimal mix of generating plants available to meet demand 
fluctuations without excessive risk of outages, and capacity should 
evolve over time in line with demand growth, all at the lowest 
practicable cost while maintaining incentives to invest. 
 
In past decades, both the evaluation of appropriate capacity 
levels and the formulation of the best response to it would have 
been accomplished through central planning mechanisms (Fitz 
Gerald et al., 2005, p.57). The central planner would specify a level 
of capacity (for example, by calculating expected demand plus a 
reserve margin) thought sufficient to meet a defined standard for 
system reliability. 
 
In contrast, a core premise of the new All-Island Market2 is that 
the regulators should put a mechanism in place that will allow 
market forces to ensure that adequate capacity is built in an efficient 
and timely manner. Use of markets, rather than central planning, to 
deliver the required level of capacity has important advantages; in 
particular, it should help improve efficiency and lower prices in the 
long run. However, it also presents challenges for policymakers. 
Rather than the central planner setting capacity by fiat, investors 
must be given incentives to build the right sorts of generating plants 
at the right times and ensure they are available to generate power 
when needed. 
 
The market’s designers have gone to some lengths to create 
appropriate investment incentives for this purpose. Delivered 
through a system of administrative “capacity payments”, the essence 
of these incentives is to increase certainty of revenues and allow 
generators who make plant available at times when capacity margins 
are relatively tight to earn revenues in such periods that are higher, 
and in some cases considerably higher, than their short-run costs. 
The expectation of additional payments at times of scarcity is 
intended to provide a signal for market participants to ensure that 
additional capacity is made available when it is required. The overall 
level of capacity payments is derived administratively from estimates 
of the tightness of the market and the cost of new peaking capacity.3 
 
The performance of such a mechanism in practice depends 
crucially upon how market participants respond to the incentives it 
provides. Theory and international regulatory experience emphasise 
 
2 The All-Island market is a single electricity market covering Northern Ireland and 
the Republic of Ireland, and it is scheduled to go live in November 2007. 
3 Peaking plants display a relatively high variable cost of electricity generation, but 
fairly low fixed costs. Additionally, they may be switched on and off frequently 
without excessive cost. Plants suited to such intra-day switching are used to meet 
demand fluctuations efficiently. On the other hand, base load plants, with relatively 
high fixed and low variable costs, are optimised for use in a relatively continuous 
way. Mid-merit plants fall somewhere in between: ideally they produce for several 
hours, but can be shut down and restarted daily. 
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the role of credibility as a necessary condition for enabling 
investment incentives to operate effectively. By credibility, we mean 
that the state must be in a position to pre-commit that it will not 
change the rules of the game once irreversible investments are in 
place. If this sort of credibility is lacking, the market may be subject 
to under-investment (Blackmon and Zeckhauser, 1992).4 
 
This is not merely a theoretical point. Continued increases in 
demand and planned retirement of old plant imply that significant 
new electricity generation capacity will be needed over the next 
seven years (Eirgrid, 2006). Figure 1 below illustrates the extent of 
future requirements for the All-Island market.  
 Figure 1: Electricity Generation Capacity in the All-Island Market 
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Sources: ESRI analysis of generation and transmission adequacy reports published 
by the System Operator for Northern Ireland and Eirgrid. 
 
Note that the white “New” segment at the top of the chart 
grows rapidly from 2011 onwards. This represents incremental 
capacity that will be required to maintain the 2006 level of supply 
adequacy, allowing for expected demand growth, increases in wind 
power supply and current plans for plant retirements and 
introductions. 
 
Indeed, capacity margins are already relatively tight. Forced 
outages5 among a small number of ageing generation units could 
sharply increase the risk of shortages if they were to coincide with 
peak winter demand (Malaguzzi Valeri and Tol, 2006).  
 
 
4 Hold-up problems such as this have been studied extensively in the contracts 
theory literature. See Schmitz (2001) for a recent survey. 
5 An unscheduled event, such as a technical failure, during which a plant is unable 
to make all or part of its planned capacity available to the market. 
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In this paper, we first describe the institutional arrangements 
used in the SEM to provide capacity incentives and discuss the role 
of credibility in allowing the market to work. We then examine three 
important influences on investors’ incentives. First, we use a static 
model of the Single Electricity Market (SEM) to identify the signals 
the new market will send investors as to the types of generating 
plant that should be built. Second, we consider the effects of likely 
future developments in the market, in particular the rapid increase 
in wind generating capacity. Finally, we analyse some of the sources 
of risk faced by investors in generating plants, and we suggest that 
there are important differences in the incidence of the main sources 
of risk across plant types. 
 
Our static comparison provides ambiguous results as to which 
sorts of plant should be most attractive to investors. Plant 
profitability in a relatively small market is likely to be cyclical due to 
the relatively large size of new plants in comparison to the total 
market. The growing importance of wind generation in the SEM 
suggests that the system will need more mid-merit and peaking 
capacity to help meet system reliability goals in future. We also note 
that plant retirements planned by the ESB in the next few years are 
concentrated in the mid-merit segment. Furthermore, peaking and 
mid-merit plants trading in the SEM should face significantly lower 
economic, market and credit risks than those faced by base load 
plants. However, plants that rely heavily on capacity payments are 
likely to face higher exposure to political and regulatory risk. If such 
risks are seen as significant, this could have the effect of distorting 
investors’ choices as to which sorts of plant to build, as well as how 
much investment to commit. 
 
To ensure that there is sufficient investment to meet Ireland’s 
capacity needs and to allow the market to deliver an optimal 
portfolio of plant types, the SEM must be credible. The third 
section of the paper refers to direct government intervention in 
electricity capacity. Recent announcements suggest that this may 
continue in parallel with the development of the SEM. Such 
intervention could lead to problems in establishing credibility for 
the new market. 
 
In the final section, we outline some ways in which the Irish 
government might support regulatory credibility, increasing societal 
welfare in the long term. 
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In their design for the new SEM, Ireland’s two regulators6 have 
chosen a mechanism that should allow the market to determine 
when, where and by whom new generation capacity will be built. 
The model is not completely devoid of state intervention, as 
discussed below. However, the logic of this approach is that 
markets will be better than central planning at building and 
maintaining generating assets that deliver adequate capacity at least 
cost. In this section, we discuss the features within the SEM that are 
intended to ensure that adequate capacity is supplied by the market. 
While this system may be the best option for Ireland, it presents 
considerable challenges, especially in the establishment and 
maintenance of regulatory credibility. 
1. 
Incentives to 
Supply 
Adequate 
Electricity 
Generation 
INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES FOR ENSURING THERE IS 
ADEQUATE CAPACITY 
The SEM is an “integrated” market, by which we mean that all 
physical trading of energy is done through a mandatory pool, and it 
incorporates a capacity payments mechanism. This type of 
mechanism provides an administratively determined payment for 
each unit of generating capacity that is made available. Paid for by 
electricity users, these payments are intended to offset some of the 
fixed costs of generation, encouraging market participants to offer 
an efficient level of capacity despite the (parallel) imposition of 
limitations on wholesale prices.7 In the SEM the total annual pot of 
capacity payments is determined in the autumn and is fixed for one 
calendar year. The pot of capacity payments depends broadly on 
how tight the market is and on the annual cost of running a best-
new-entrant peaking plant. Both these measures are revised once a 
year. 
 
Several alternative market-based mechanisms are used 
internationally to provide efficient incentives for supply of electricity 
generation capacity; De Vries (2007), includes a useful discussion of 
them. We draw upon his analysis when summarising the main types 
below: 
 
Energy-only markets allow wholesale prices to vary freely. 
Periods of scarcity are likely to lead to very high prices, which 
should act as a signal for potential entrants. However, few 
jurisdictions are willing to tolerate such extreme price volatility, and 
the combination of energy-only pricing with price cap measures is 
likely to lead to under-investment in capacity.8 Moreover, payoffs to 
investors in such a market are likely to be highly dependent on 
 
6 The Commission for Energy Regulation in the Republic of Ireland and the 
Northern Ireland Authority for Utility Regulation. 
7 In the SEM, prices are limited through bidding principles. 
8 System reliability is thought to have public good characteristics, which implies 
that it would likely be under-supplied in the absence of state intervention (Joskow, 
2006, p.8). 
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prices in a few peak hours each year, and these are likely to be 
difficult to forecast. 
 
Strategic Reserve measures take a portion of capacity out of 
the market and earmark it for use by the system operator when 
reserve margins are tight. Their effectiveness depends upon the 
assumptions that the market will replace the assets placed in the 
strategic reserve and that a central planner can correctly identify the 
optimal size of the reserve and price at which it should be 
dispatched. 
 
Operating Reserves Pricing places a similar informational 
burden on the system operator. In this mechanism, a volume of 
reserve capacity is purchased in daily auctions, alongside normal 
operating requirements. Because of the long lead time in building 
electricity plants, this mechanism may also be vulnerable to 
investment cycles, as prices signalling scarcity lead to excess entry, 
followed by periods of underinvestment when prices signal that 
capacity is adequate. 
 
Capacity Requirements and related models focus on the volume 
of capacity rather than its price as in the models we have discussed 
thus far. Either the system operator or electricity customers 
(including retail electricity companies and large users) are required 
to buy sufficient capacity commitments forward to meet expected 
demand.9 The certainty provided by these forward purchases is 
intended to provide an incentive for efficient investment. These 
models have some attractive theoretical properties, but they rely on 
the presence of effective competition in the supply of capacity.10 In 
a small and concentrated market such as the SEM, a forward 
capacity auction might be vulnerable to exercise of market power by 
the largest players.11 
 
Although a capacity payments system is probably the most 
appropriate mechanism for Ireland at present, given that the ESB 
retains significant market power,12 it is important to recognise some 
of its potential shortcomings. First, the system places an important 
component of price setting in regulators’ hands. The level of these 
capacity payments is based on administrative estimates of the cost 
of building and maintaining a peaking plant. The incentive 
properties and the credibility of the SEM are thus dependent upon 
 
9 Some variants, such as reliability contract models, employ call options rather than 
forward purchases of capacity. See e.g., De Vries (2007), pp. 27-29. 
10 De Vries (2007) notes that international trade in electricity would erode many of 
the advantages of a system of capacity payments; because of limited and de facto 
unidirectional interconnection, this problem does not hold for Ireland. 
11 See Malaguzzi Valeri (2006) p. 9, for a discussion of capacity market power 
problems that have arisen in the PJM system in the United States. 
12 If structural change leads to strengthened competition in the future, this would 
improve the case for using some form of forward capacity market. 
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the regulator’s ability to set an appropriate level of capacity 
payments. 
 
Identifying the right level of capacity payments is not easy, and 
the information provided by market participants on this issue is 
likely to be one-sided. Both entrants and incumbents have a 
common interest in arguing for a formula that will provide the 
highest possible level of payments. Electricity users would prefer 
the payments (and hence retail prices) to be lower for a given level 
of capacity, but electricity users do not tend to respond to 
regulatory consultations. 
REGULATORY CREDIBILITY AND PUBLIC OWNERSHIP 
OF GENERATION ASSETS 
There is a second and less direct, but equally important, way in 
which government actions may affect the capacity payments 
mechanism. The Irish government retains an influence over a 
significant proportion of existing capacity through its ownership of 
the ESB. Public ownership of the largest electricity generation 
company may give rise to a temptation towards direct intervention 
in the market. This is partly because the transaction costs associated 
with direct intervention (e.g. through influence over investment or 
pricing decisions) may be lower, or more importantly may be 
perceived to be lower, when the state owns a generator than when it 
does not. 
 
Why might a government wish to intervene in this way? There 
are many reasons, but two of the main ones are because the state 
has a direct stake in the success of the enterprise through the value 
of its shareholding (which for example might be slated for eventual 
privatisation), and the government may have conflicting objectives 
such as maintaining peaceful industrial relations in the short run and 
maximising long-run consumer welfare. Even if no direct 
intervention is intended, the government faces an additional hurdle 
when trying to signal to the markets that it will allow the market to 
operate without interference (Willig, 1994, pp.157-158; Boycko et al., 
1996, p. 318). 
 
One advantage the SEM possesses when trying to establish 
credibility is its cross-border dimension. Establishing the market on 
foot of arrangements agreed between two governments and two 
regulators should make it more difficult for any one party to change 
the rules for short-term gain. Changing such an arrangement 
probably involves higher transaction costs than altering the rules 
within a single jurisdiction. In a related move, the Irish government 
recently removed issues affecting the SEM from the set of areas on 
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which the Minister may give policy directions to the CER.13 This 
change should also serve to increase the credibility of policy related 
to the market. 
 
In parallel with the development of the SEM, the Commission 
for Energy Regulation (CER) has announced that structural reforms 
will be undertaken to improve the effectiveness of competition. 
Many previous studies have considered models for reducing the 
ESB’s market power in generation by requiring the sale of some of 
its generating assets (recent contributions include Deloitte & 
Touche, 2005; McCarthy, 2005, and IPA Consulting et al., 2001). In 
practice, structural change seems likely to rely not on a regulatory 
mandate, but on an agreement between the ESB and the CER that 
the firm will divest up to 30 per cent of its generation capacity 
before 2010 (CER, 2007).  
 
The recent Energy White Paper also indicates that the 
government will switch the ownership of transmission assets from 
the ESB to Eirgrid as a means of “…enhancing competition and 
transparency and reducing costs” (DCMNR, 2007b, p.48). Such 
structural changes should reinforce regulatory credibility and 
strengthen competition in two ways. First, ownership of 
transmission assets by the generating company could encourage an 
external perception that that there may be an incentive for subtle 
forms of qualitative favouritism between the two companies. 
Transfer of the assets should help remove any such perception. 
Although conduct regulation is used to prevent favouritism of this 
kind, the point of structural regulation is to limit the need for 
conduct regulation while controlling the exercise of market power. 
Second, to the extent that different levels of risk are associated with 
the transmission and generation businesses, borrowing costs based 
on pooled assets could facilitate implicit cross-subsidies to the 
higher risk business. Transfer of the assets (together with associated 
debt), should also eliminate this possibility. 
 
The SEM needs to build credibility in order to operate efficiently 
in the long term, and this task is made more difficult by the absence 
of a track record for the market, the administrative challenges of 
setting capacity payments and the scale of state involvement in 
electricity generation. It may be helped by the pre-commitment 
associated with its cross-border dimension and by actions taken to 
reduce concentration and facilitate effective competition. 
 
 
 
13 Ministerial policy directions are permitted under Section 7 of the Energy 
Regulation Act 1999; the amendment was made in Section 11(d) of the Electricity 
Regulation (Amendment) (Single Electricity Market) Act 2007. 
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We have earlier noted that Ireland faces a capacity deficit in the 
medium term. If the SEM performs as designed, it should eliminate 
this deficit by providing incentives for entry through the signal of 
high capacity payments at times when the system is under stress. In 
this section, we ask what sort of plant the SEM’s incentives might 
be expected to attract.  
2. 
Investment 
Signals from 
the SEM
MODELLING OF CAPACITY INVESTMENT OPTIONS 
We start with a static comparison of alternative plant types, using a 
model of economic dispatch for the SEM. This is not intended to 
be a full project appraisal of the various options, but rather to focus 
on the main features of the investment decision. The cost of fuel 
used (at 2006 prices),14 an estimate of O&M costs and the capital 
employed by each sort of plant are all taken into account.15 Carbon 
prices are assumed to be zero. Plants earn revenue from sales of 
energy to the market and from capacity payments.16 Capacity 
payments have been distributed across the available plant using 
broad assumptions on availability and assuming no forced outages. 
 
The Irish government has ambitious targets for the share of 
electricity to be provided by renewable sources in the coming years. 
On present trends, it seems possible that the market will meet or 
exceed these targets, principally through the construction of wind 
generation capacity.17 Increases in the use of wind generation are 
included in our modelling, based on projections in Eirgrid (2006).   
 
We have estimated the model for two capacity scenarios: one 
representing the set of generating plants expected to be available at 
the start of 2008 and the other as at the end of 2011. We provide 
more details of the two scenarios below, but the main differences 
between them relate to the introduction of two new CCGTs, a 
substantial increase in the amount of wind capacity and planned 
retirements of other plants by the ESB.  
 
For each scenario, we calculate the short-run return on capital 
employed (ROCE) by subtracting fuel and O&M costs from total 
revenue, including capacity payments, and dividing the result by the 
capital employed.18 This assumption allows us to make a static 
comparison between plant types, but it means we are not allowing 
 
14 Prices were based on IEA averages for the first three quarters of 2006. 
15 However, we abstract from ancillary services and the costs of start-up and 
ramping up and down generators. 
16 We assume plants bid at fuel cost. This leads to conservative estimates of energy 
prices, since bids are likely to cover at least some other variable costs. 
17 However, there is also a renewables target for all energy use. Renewables are 
relatively more expensive in other forms of energy use, particularly transport, so 
power generation may need to considerably exceed its own target. 
18 Total revenue includes revenue from sales of energy and capacity payments, but 
omits ancillary services. The inframarginal rent component is also excluded from 
capacity payments, because it is not clear how it will be applied in the future. 
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for effects on a plant’s profitability of subsequent entry to the 
market. As we shall see later, such dynamic effects may change this 
static picture considerably. 
 
Table A below summarises our results for the 2008 scenario. 
The table compares the return on capital employed that would be 
earned by a marginal (10MW) new investment in a gas fired 
CCGT,19 which is suited to base load generation, compared to a 
similar investment in a gas fired OCGT,20 which is better suited to 
mid-merit or peaking operation.21 This small increment to capacity 
is employed as a simplifying device to assist comparison of plant 
types, abstracting from the “lumpiness” of generation investments. 
In practice, generation investments have a much higher minimum 
efficient scale.22 To provide additional context, the results include 
estimates of return on capital for existing peaking plant and the 
(base load) Moneypoint coal plant. For the latter, we provide 
estimates both at historic cost23 and assumed replacement cost.  
Table A: Marginal Profitability of Different Plant Types under the SEM – 2008 Scenario 
      
Plant Type Plant Size Utilisation 
Rate 
Surplus over 
Operating 
Costs 
Capital 
Employed 
Return on Capital 
Employed  
(year 1) 
 MW % €m €m % 
New Marginal CCGT  10 91.00 0.614 7.03 8.7 
New Marginal OCGT 10 8.20 0.228 4.74 4.8 
Existing Peaker 52 0.23 1.670 20.00 8.4 
Moneypoint historic 284 91.00 90.400 120.00 75.3 
Moneypoint 
replacement 284 91.00 90.400 200.00 45.2 
      
 
In the 2008 scenario, system capacity is relatively tight and we 
estimate the time-weighted average price to be about €64 per MWh. 
CCGTs have been popular among actual and potential entrants in 
the past. Under our assumptions, a marginal investment in CCGT 
capacity would make a return of 8.7 per cent. This figure is slightly 
higher than the assumed “Best New Entrant” (BNE) cost of capital 
(7.83 per cent),24 but it important to note that the returns shown in 
this table do not include likely revenue from sources omitted from 
our analysis (ancillary services revenue, the inframarginal rents 
element of capacity payments, ancillary services revenue and any 
element of O&M costs included in energy bids). In practice, the full 
 
19 Combined-cycle gas turbine. 
20 Open-cycle gas turbine. 
21 Recently the regulatory authorities of the SEM have decided that for technical 
reasons the theoretical best-new-entrant peaking plant will run on distillate oil and 
not gas (All Island Project, 2007). However, this does not affect our analysis. 
22 For example, a new CCGT would normally generate about 400MW per hour. 
23 We take the €368 million cost of installing flue gas desulphurisation at 
Moneypoint as the capital value for the historic cost analysis. 
24 All Island Project, 2007, p. 21. 
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expected return for each plant type should therefore be higher than 
our estimates.  
 
Moneypoint does better than a marginal CCGT, due to a 
combination of its low cost fuel (coal), zero assumed price of 
carbon and the use of historic cost in valuing its capital employed. 
The use of replacement cost would reduce Moneypoint’s estimated 
return on capital, but we find that the plant would still make a 
substantial return if the treatment were changed to replacement 
cost. A change in the price of carbon could adversely affect 
Moneypoint’s profitability; however, given 2006 fuel prices, 
Moneypoint would still be dispatched unless carbon prices climbed 
to over €50 per tonne.  
 
Because the capacity payments system is designed to allow an 
efficient OCGT to make a normal return, we might expect that an 
incremental investment in this type of plant would receive net 
revenue close to its required cost of capital. However, as noted 
above, the returns shown in Table A cannot be directly compared to 
the BNE cost of capital. We carried out a simple off-model analysis 
that suggests the apparent shortfall for this plant type compared to 
the BNE cost of capital is approximately equal to likely revenue 
from sources not included in our model. 
 
It is important to note that in this scenario the level of demand 
is high relative to the level of generating capacity in the market. 
Such scarcity conditions should have a pronounced effect on 
peakers, which run for more hours than they would if a substantial 
capacity margin were available. Therefore, the market should (and 
our model suggests, would) pay oil-fired peaking plants significantly 
more than their cost of capital under our 2008 assumptions.  
 
Our second static scenario moves the clock forward to 2011 (see 
Table B below). By this time, we assume, all plant scheduled for 
withdrawal from the market in Eirgrid’s 2007-2013 Generation 
Adequacy report will have gone. These withdrawals account for 
over 1,000MW of capacity assumed to be operating in 2007.25 In 
addition, we assume that two new 400MW CCGT plants approved 
for construction by ESB and Bord Gais will have entered the 
market, along with an additional 1,000MW of wind generation 
capacity. Annual demand growth is included at the average of the 
high and low predictions given in the ESRI Medium-Term Review. 
 
By 2011, the net effect of generation construction and 
withdrawals is to substantially widen the margin of available 
generation over demand. The time-weighted average price is 
predicted to fall to about €58 per MWh (from €64 on the 2008 
scenario). 
 
25 Great Island is assumed to have closed prior to the 2008 scenario, and steam 
capacity from Tarbert and Poolbeg is assumed to be closed by 2011. 
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Table B: Marginal Profitability of Different Plant Types under the SEM – 2011 Scenario 
      
Plant Type Plant Size Utilisation 
Rate 
Surplus over 
Operating Costs 
Capital 
Employed 
Return on 
Capital 
Employed 
(year 1) 
 MW % €m €m % 
New Marginal CCGT  10 79.0 0.135 7.03 1.9 
New Marginal OCGT 10 4.5 0.116 4.74 2.4 
Existing Peaker 52 0.0 1.390 20.00 7.0 
Moneypoint historic 284 91.0 77.600 120.00 64.7 
Moneypoint      
replacement 284 91.0 77.600 200.00 38.8 
      
 
The resulting decrease in the profitability of generation affects all 
plants to some extent, but the predicted impact is relatively limited 
for plants towards the bottom or top of the merit order. The results 
reported above for Moneypoint and existing peakers are 
qualitatively similar to those reported above for 2008. 
 
However, the withdrawal of expensive26 mid-merit capacity and 
its replacement by substantial new wind and CCGT capacity has the 
effect of reducing the predicted ROCE of a new marginal CCGT 
investment by about 7 percentage points (from 8.7 per cent to 1.9 
per cent). The returns on a marginal investment in OCGT capacity 
fall too, but by less than 3 percentage points (from 4.8 per cent to 
2.4 per cent). 
 
The changing relative fortunes of these two plant types appear to 
reflect the shift in the SEM’s plant portfolio away from mid-merit 
and towards wind and base load capacity. While the utilisation of an 
incremental OCGT is reduced compared to the 2008 scenario, 
falling from 8.2 per cent to 4.5 per cent, this change is modest 
compared to the fall in utilisation of an incremental CCGT (from 91 
per cent, which is the maximum level allowed in the model, to 79 
per cent). Indeed, older CCGTs are affected still more adversely by 
the increase in total capacity and changes in the plant portfolio. For 
example, the 2011 simulation shows Huntstown 1 and Dublin 
Bay/Synergen running at about half capacity. 
 
Comparing the 2008 and 2011 scenarios illustrates three key 
points about the SEM. First, plant profitability in a relatively small 
market is likely to be cyclical. Since increments to capacity tend to 
be relatively large compared to the size of the market, new plants 
will tend to depress profitability when they are first brought on 
stream, at least until demand has time to catch up with the new 
capacity level. Given that new investment to date has focused on 
CCGTs, the profitability of older (invariably less efficient) CCGTs 
is most affected by such increments. 
 
 
26 In the sense of high marginal cost. 
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Second, the unprecedented rise of wind generation, if it 
continues, seems likely to put pressure on the profitability of 
CCGTs. This, combined with firm plans for two new CCGTs, 
suggests that the SEM may be oversupplied with base load capacity 
in the medium term. Some plants may even be pushed towards the 
limits of their cycling ability.27 However, it is not clear whether the 
rate of growth in wind generation capacity can or will be maintained 
at this level. 
 
Finally, investments in peaking and mid-merit capacity are likely 
to be less acutely affected by these changes in the SEM’s capacity 
level and mix. Coal generation will remain profitable unless there is 
a substantial increase in the carbon price, together with a fall in the 
relative price of gas to coal. 
EFFECTS OF INCREASING THE SHARE OF 
RENEWABLES IN GENERATION 
Beyond the effects we have modelled, the rising share of wind 
generation has further implications for the maintenance of adequate 
capacity and for the relative attractiveness of other types of plants 
on the system. 
 
Because the short- to medium-term availability of electricity 
generated from wind is constrained by weather conditions, wind 
plants normally require commitment of other types of plants as 
backup. In effect, if wind levels drop but demand remains high, 
other generation assets must be available to take up the slack, 
sometimes in a relatively short time.  
 
Peaking and mid-merit plants such as OCGTs are generally 
better suited to a reserve role than CCGTs. As the share of wind on 
the system rises, the efficient mix of plants should thus also include 
a rising share of peaking and mid-merit plants relative to base load 
capacity.28 The new SEM should facilitate this, because the demand 
for generation capacity net of wind power should become more volatile 
as the share of wind generation rises. This provides an additional 
reason that investment in mid-merit and peaking plant should be 
increasingly attractive over time. The modelling results given above 
do not include back-up requirements for wind power, so they are 
likely to underestimate the relative attractiveness of OCGTs. 
 
 
 
 
27 Switching on and off by a plant is known as cycling. Technical and commercial 
parameters limit the amount of cycling that is practical for a given type of plant; 
e.g. if CCGTs cycle too much they may emit excessive levels of NOx. 
28 However, the relationship is not necessarily equi-proportionate, since the output 
from wind plants in different parts of the country is not perfectly correlated. 
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IMPACT OF DIFFERING RISK PROFILES ACROSS PLANT 
TYPES  
The optimal choice of technology for a new plant is sensitive to 
several uncertain parameters. Some of these parameters are largely 
exogenous, such as prices of carbon and various fuels. Others are 
endogenous, such as the extent, type and timing of competing plant 
entry. Up to now, we have assumed that investors can be certain 
about the payoffs from generation investments, given expected 
market structure and demand. In the remainder of this section we 
relax this assumption. 
 
In particular, how does the exposure of each plant type to 
various sources of risk affect its attractiveness as an investment? 
The main risks associated with a new plant investment can be 
categorised between market and economic risks (e.g. fuel prices, 
demand growth and volatility, interest rates, labour costs, carbon 
prices); operational risks (achievable availability levels, unplanned 
outages); credit risks (depending upon contractual arrangements 
with energy customers) and political/regulatory risks (stability of the 
capacity payments system, changes to the Best New Entrant cost 
assumptions).  
 
To the extent that there are significant differences among the 
risk profiles of plant types, changes in the perceived magnitude of 
particular sources of risks may alter different plant types’ relative 
attractiveness. 
 
Given the design of the SEM, base load (e.g. CCGT) investment 
is likely to be more exposed to market, economic, operational and 
credit risk, whereas mid-merit or peaking plant investment is more 
exposed to political and regulatory risk. 
 
To see why, note that each plant type derives its revenue from 
two sources: sales of energy through the electricity pool and 
administrative capacity payments, but the relative importance of 
these two sources varies by plant type. Table C below shows the 
share of total revenue each plant type is expected to earn from 
capacity payments, based on our modelling results with (as before) 
the expected population of generating plants in 2007 and 2011. 
Table C: Regulatory Risk Profiles of Different Plant Types under the SEM 
      
 Scenario Plant Size Total 
Revenue 
Capacity 
Payments 
Revenue 
Share of Revenue 
from Capacity 
Payments 
  MW €m €m % 
Marginal CCGT  2008 10 5.50 0.500 8.9 
 2011 10 4.40 0.400 9.8 
Marginal OCGT 2008 10 1.20 0.500 42.0 
 2011 10 0.80 0.400 55.0 
Existing Peaker 2008 52 2.70 2.500 93.7 
 2011 52 2.30 2.300 100.0 
Moneypoint 2008 284 152.90 13.800 9.1 
 2011 284 142.40 15.100 8.8 
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A new CCGT is expected to earn over 90 per cent of its revenue 
from sales of electricity under the SEM. Generating this energy 
requires fuel and carbon inputs, an are reduced to the extent that 
unplanned outages occur or the plant is otherwise unavailable. 
Credit risk could arise if the plant’s output is sold through long-term 
contracts. Thus a plant of this type has significant exposure to 
economic, market, operational and credit risks. In contrast, a 
peaking plant runs only rarely and uses little fuel (and emits little 
carbon). Because peakers run much less frequently than other 
plants, they may also be less vulnerable to operational risks. An 
unplanned outage would be costly for such a plant if it occurred at a 
time when the plant would have been dispatched (when prices are 
high), but if the risk of such breakdowns is more evenly distributed 
over time periods, the plant’s revenues should be less vulnerable to 
unplanned outages than those of plants that run more continuously. 
 
If these were the only risks faced by a plant investment, peaking 
and mid-merit investments should be more appealing than base load 
investments if expected rates of return for the former were at least 
as high and investors were risk averse. 
 
However, the incidence of political and regulatory risk is 
probably quite different from the risk types discussed so far. In the 
SEM, the level of capacity payments seems more acutely exposed to 
political and regulatory decisions than energy revenues are. Through 
the bidding principles, energy revenues will be limited to a level 
associated with the variable costs of a marginal plant, and it is hard 
to see how a regulator could reduce them significantly from such 
levels. Maintenance of the capacity payments regime, in contrast, 
relies on political support and on the credibility of administrative 
decisions about quite technical parameters, in particular 
assumptions about Best New Entrant costs.  
 
Base load plants like CCGTs and Moneypoint, which in any 
scenario earn most of their revenues from energy, would be least 
affected (in relative terms) if capacity payments were to change. A 
marginal investment in OCGT capacity would feel a substantially 
stronger effect from changes in capacity payments, with about half 
of its revenues depending upon the mechanism. Peakers earn almost 
all of their revenues from capacity payments when there is adequate 
capacity, but even when capacity is tight (as in our 2008 scenario), 
the vast majority of their revenues still come from this source. 
 
If the governments or regulators were to intervene in a way that 
removed or reduced capacity payments after an investor had already 
built a plant, some of the revenues the investor expected might not 
materialise. Actual returns would then be lower than those expected 
at the time of investment. If this risk is material, investors will take 
it into account when deciding whether, how much and what type of 
investment to commit. 
 
 76
Taken together, our results on investment incentives suggest that 
the SEM design will deliver rates of return on new generating 
capacity that should be sufficient to attract new entry, provided the 
market arrangements are seen as credible. The mix of plant that it 
favours is less clear, depending partly on dynamic factors we have 
not modelled fully here and partly on the strength of regulatory 
credibility that accompanies it. 
 
In the next section we discuss a second strand of government 
policy towards electricity market capacity that may also have 
implications for regulatory credibility and the future development of 
electricity generation capacity. 
 
 To achieve the best long-run outcome, the SEM’s regulators need 
to ensure that the capacity mechanism accommodates a set of 
strategies by all players (incumbents, entrants, government) that will 
lead to the highest possible societal welfare. These strategies must 
also be incentive-compatible for each participant. For example, if 
the mechanism was designed to deliver too little capacity and 
shortages would result, it would not be credible to assume that 
government would refrain from intervention. 
3. 
Direct State 
Intervention in 
Electricity 
Capacity 
 
Although the SEM includes mechanisms that should bring 
electricity capacity into line with demand, recent policy 
developments might be interpreted as suggesting a lack of 
confidence in its speed or efficacy. As we will discuss in the next 
section, the government and regulators may wish to take actions to 
counter this impression and thereby reinforce the credibility of the 
SEM. 
 
Our main source of concern is the Irish government’s apparent 
intention to establish a new parallel capacity acquisition mechanism. 
In the recent White Paper, the government sets out seven steps it 
will take to “[ensure] that generation adequacy margins are 
improved….” Some of these steps are complementary to the SEM, 
including actions to improve provision of information and site 
availability. However, two steps may be read as alternatives to the 
SEM, or at least to anticipate its possible failure to deliver adequate 
capacity: 
 
• CER and EirGrid to facilitate and oversee the competitive 
provision of additional mid-merit/flexible generating plant of at 
least 240MW over the next 12-18 months to address demand 
and capacity constraints in the immediate term. This will also 
contribute to a more balanced power generation portfolio in 
support of competition and the growth of wind energy on the 
system; 
• EirGrid and CER to plan for the undertaking of a fast build 
option over the next 12 months should this be warranted for 
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generation security of supply reasons and the ownership and 
operation of such plant will be awarded by competitive tender.29 
 
While no further details of these planned initiatives were 
provided, one gets the impression that the government is 
contemplating a second capacity-setting mechanism to operate 
alongside the SEM. From the wording used in the White Paper, this 
might involve construction of a strategic reserve (an option 
mentioned earlier in this paper).  
 
Whether or not the parallel mechanism is intended to be a 
strategic reserve or some other way of boosting system capacity, the 
possibility that it will be employed is likely to affect investor 
behaviour under the SEM. In particular, investors will place less 
confidence in the likely future returns available through the SEM if 
they believe that government might construct alternative capacity, 
particularly if it is to be remunerated through some separate 
mechanism.  
 
Suppose, for example, that the new mechanism involved 
building a significant amount of mid-merit or peaking capacity 
through a tender process and dispatching these plants outside the 
SEM (e.g. by the system operator, as in some strategic reserve 
systems). This could significantly lower the volatility of residual 
demand for those in the SEM and thereby affect the distribution of 
capacity payments available through it. Once the new mechanism 
was in place, the government might also be tempted to put 
downward pressure on the sum of money made available through 
the capacity payments mechanism, since the capacity problem 
would have been “solved”. 
 
We do not suggest that this is what the government actually 
intends to do, but leaving its intentions unclear poses a significant 
risk to the credibility of the SEM.  
 
A second more general area of concern arises from potential 
uncertainty over how the government views its role as a shareholder 
in the ESB, and in particular whether that role may affect its stance 
towards the SEM capacity mechanism. 
 
We have earlier emphasised that state ownership of significant 
generating assets places an additional “burden of proof” on the 
government as it tries to establish regulatory credibility. A variety of 
measures have been taken that may help address this issue, 
including establishment of an independent regulator, use of a cross-
border basis for the SEM, separation of distribution and generation 
businesses, and encouragement of the ESB to divest generation 
capacity and sites. However, credibility will ultimately depend upon 
 
29 DCMNR (2007b, p. 22). 
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whether the government is perceived to maintain a firm separation 
between its roles as owner of the ESB and regulator of the market. 
Nowhere is this more important than in decisions about 
construction of capacity, where firms are making commitments to 
long-term capital investment. 
 
There is a recent example of how perceptions about the state’s 
two roles may become entangled. In January 2007, the Irish 
government announced that it would permit the ESB to build a new 
power station at Aghada, Co. Cork (DCMNR, 2007a). This move 
was long in preparation, and it may well be justified. As the largest 
generator in the country, it is to be expected that the ESB would 
wish to continue to invest in capacity, and state support for such 
investment may be appropriate as long as the competitive playing 
field is level and the state is investing in the expectation of receiving 
commercial returns.  
 
However, part of the stated rationale for government approval 
of the Aghada investment was to help meet an expected shortfall in 
Ireland’s electricity generation capacity from 2009 (DCMNR, 
2007a). This gives the impression that the government’s decisions as 
shareholder are linked to its actions on capacity (which under the 
SEM should be firm-neutral regulatory matters). Even though this 
particular decision came before activation of the SEM, it might have 
been better for the announcement to emphasise that future capacity 
requirements are expected to be met through the incentives 
provided by the SEM.  
 
 There is a valid choice to be made between a centrally planned 
system and one that relies on market forces to ensure that there is 
adequate electricity capacity. We consider that the broad model 
selected for the SEM is the better choice because the market should 
deliver lower cost supply in the long run, but in principle either 
approach could deliver adequate capacity. 
4. 
Implications 
for Future 
Policy 
 
However, the worst possible outcome would be one in which 
the state intervenes over time to manage capacity levels, and the fact 
of this intervention undermines the credibility required to operate a 
market-based SEM. Lack of competitive investment through the 
SEM would then provide a rationale for continued state 
intervention, leading to a high intervention, low competition 
equilibrium. This might even be worse for electricity users than if 
the system was based on central planning in the first place. 
Additional inducements would probably have to be offered to firms 
providing capacity outside the SEM, and in the presence of barriers 
to entry, the existence of two mechanisms could offer opportunities 
for strategic behaviour by those in the market (e.g. potential 
investors withholding commitments to extract better terms from the 
state). Moreover, capacity payments would still be paid at a level 
intended to attract new investment. 
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Our modelling results suggest that the capacity payments 
mechanism should be able to provide appropriate signals as to the 
timing and nature of required capacity. However, the signals the 
mechanism sends out concerning how much to invest and what 
types of plant to build are highly sensitive to a range of factors, 
including the extent of perceived political and regulatory risk, the 
existing mix of plant in the system (and hence the pattern of 
withdrawals) and the Best New Entrant cost assumptions. 
 
The regulators may wish to consider what measures may be 
available to bolster their perceived commitment to the capacity 
payments mechanism. One option would be to pre-commit to a 
minimum level of capacity payments, or a fixed schedule, for a 
number of years – or at least specify a high hurdle for changing the 
previously announced capacity payments. This could help to reduce 
market uncertainty about expected revenues from this source, 
reducing the perceived risk of mid-merit and peaking plant in 
particular. A related option would be to pre-commit not to change 
the assumptions made about cost of a Best New Entrant plant for a 
specified period of time. As well as reducing regulatory risk during 
the period covered, this would also have the effect of slowing 
revenue reductions that might otherwise accrue due to technological 
change. If a highly efficient new technology were introduced, its 
lower costs would not feed through to capacity payments while the 
control was in place. This measure could transfer significant benefits 
from consumers to producers if technology were to advance rapidly, 
so its effects should be considered carefully before it is applied. 
 
Credibility may be also be adversely affected if government is 
seen as likely to intervene directly when signals for additional 
capacity investment are likely to be strong (i.e. when the risk of 
shortages, and hence levels of capacity payments, are high). We have 
concerns about the Irish government’s apparent intention, 
mentioned in the White Paper, to establish a new parallel capacity 
acquisition mechanism. Little detail about these plans has been 
published to date. If a back-up capacity mechanism is to be 
established, it is vital that the government signal well in advance the 
conditions under which it will be activated and explain how its 
operation will affect those providing capacity through the SEM. 
 
Measures such as these should complement policies directed at 
facilitating effective competition and encouraging demand-side 
responsiveness, with the ultimate goal of delivering adequate 
capacity at least cost.  
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